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Abstract
Machine learning models are powerful but fallible. Generating adversarial exam-
ples - inputs deliberately crafted to cause model misclassification or other errors -
can yield important insight into model assumptions and vulnerabilities. Despite
significant recent work on adversarial example generation targeting image classi-
fiers, relatively little work exists exploring adversarial example generation for text
classifiers; additionally, many existing adversarial example generation algorithms
require full access to target model parameters, rendering them impractical for many
real-world attacks. In this work, we introduce DANCin SEQ2SEQ, a GAN-inspired
algorithm for adversarial text example generation targeting largely black-box text
classifiers. We recast adversarial text example generation as a reinforcement learn-
ing problem, and demonstrate that our algorithm offers preliminary but promising
steps towards generating semantically meaningful adversarial text examples in a
real-world attack scenario.
1 Introduction
Machine learning models are powerful but fallible. Despite their surge in popularity for applications
ranging from transportation to healthcare, a growing body of research demonstrates that many models
are vulnerable to adversarial examples: inputs crafted to deliberately fool a targeted model into
outputting an incorrect result or class [Szegedy et al., 2013]. These examples successfully fool even
state-of-the-art deep networks - in fact, recent work suggests that the very expressiveness of neural
networks renders them particularly vulnerable to certain adversarial attacks [Goodfellow et al., 2014].
Generating and defending against adversarial examples is essential for better model security: as
machine learning models deployed towards increasingly complex and high-risk domains, holding
machine learning models to the security standards of any other software is essential to ensuring
user safety and trust. Adversarial examples can also yield broader insights into the targeted models
themselves - much as optical illusions can guide research in human cognition, studying where and
how models make mistakes can shed critical light on what a model does and does not actually know.
In this paper, we propose a method to generate adversarial text examples that fool or increase the
probability of misclassification in binary text classifiers. Text classifiers are now arguably some
of the most commonly deployed machine learning models, used in high-impact domains ranging
from spam classification to medical record analysis; however, many standard techniques used to
generate adversarial examples have largely focused on image classifiers, and rely on gradient-based,
visually imperceptible changes to existing images that do not easily apply to discrete and semantically
meaningful text sequences. Here, we reframe adversarial text example generation as a reinforcement
learning task and draw on GAN-inspired learning techniques to generate examples attacking a targeted
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classifier 1. This method allows for practical blackbox attacks - unlike many other approaches, we do
not rely on access to the target model parameters - and early empirical results demonstrate that this
method can generate modified text examples that increase the probability of misclassification, while
preserving semantic similarity to the original text.
2 Related Work
Szegedy et. al first described the vulnerability of deep neural networks to adversarial image examples,
and proposed a method to find these examples by searching over visually imperceptible perturbations
to existing images within the transformed image space [Szegedy et al., 2013]. Goodfellow et. al later
demonstrated the fast gradient sign method, a much cheaper method to generate adversarial image
examples by exploiting the linear behavior of neural networks [Goodfellow et al., 2014]. Recent
work has demonstrated that these adversarial image examples are alarmingly robust - many continue
to cause model errors even when downsampled or printed - and therefore practical for real world
attacks [Athalye and Sutskever, 2017].
Notably, these approaches calculate malicious perturbations based on model gradients, and require
full access to the target model parameters to construct adversarial image examples. The high-
dimensionality of the image input space poses a challenge for blackbox attacks. However, Papernot
et. al. have demonstrated that many adversarial images are also robustly transferable across many
network architectures, allowing gradient-based approaches used to target known networks to be used
against other similar but unknown models [Papernot et al., 2017].
Much less work exists, however, addressing adversarial example generation for text-based classifiers.
Jia and Liang demonstrated that networks trained for more difficult tasks, such as question answering,
can be easily fooled by introducing spurious, distracting sentences into text, but these results do
not transfer obviously to simpler text classification tasks [Jia and Liang, 2017]. Techniques used
for image example generation, however, do not directly apply in the text domain. An analogous
approach would require modifying an input text example to cause misclassification while preserving
semantics, but the discrete nature of text makes finding small but “similar”, let alone “imperceptible”,
perturbations challenging. Caswell et. al. explore methods to replace words in an input example
with their nearest neighbors in the transformed input space, but with mixed to unsuccessful results
[Caswell et al.].
3 DANCin SEQ2SEQ: Adversarial Text Example Generation
This section describes Dueling Adversarial Neural Classification in SEQ2SEQ models, or DANCin
SEQ2SEQ, a GAN-like training algorithm to generate adversarial text examples. First, we introduce
adversarial REINFORCE, a policy gradient method first described by Li et. al that adapts the GAN
framework for discrete text sequence generation [Li et al., 2017]. We then describe how this same
idea can be modified for adversarial example generation, targeting a black-box binary text classifier.
3.1 Adversarial REINFORCE for Text Generation
The idea of generative adversarial networks cannot be directly applied for text generation; unlike in
images, text sequences are discrete, which makes the discriminator error hard to backpropagate to the
generator.
The adversarial REINFORCE algorithm uses policy gradient methods to adapt the GAN objective
function for text generation [Li et al., 2017]. Li et. al. describe a formulation specifically intended
for dialogue response generation, where a model is given a dialogue history x consisting of a series
of previous dialogue utterances, and must generate a text sequence response y = y1, y2, ...yT . The
algorithm reframes text sequence generation as a sequence of actions taken according to a policy
defined by a recurrent neural network.
1A quick side note on terminology: confusingly, the word adversarial has been used in literature to apply
both to adversarial learning, as in generative adversarial networks (GANs), and adversarial examples, malicious
examples crafted to cause deliberate model errors. This work applies a GAN-like framework to construct
malicious text examples, so we will attempt to make the distinction clear whenever possible.
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Figure 1: The Adversarial REINFORCE framework and policy gradient formulation.
As with the standard GAN formulation, the algorithm consists of a generative model G and a
discriminative model D [Figure 1]. The generative model G takes a form similar to SEQ2SEQ
models, and defines the policy to generate the response y given the input dialogue history x. The
discriminative model D is a binary classifier that takes as input a sequence of dialogue utterances
{x, y}, and outputs the probability that the input dialogue episode is machine-generated (Q−{x, y})
or a real, human-generated dialogue episode (Q+{x, y}).
The algorithm uses policy gradient training to encourage the generator to produce outputs that cannot
be distinguished from human responses. The generator objective function attempts to maximize the
expected reward of generated dialogue sequences, where the discriminator score is used as a reward
in the REINFORCE formulation:
J(θ) = Ey∼p(y|x)[Q+({x, y})|θ] (1)
Given each input dialogue history x, the generator produces a generated response y by sampling
from the policy, and the pair {x, y} is fed to the discriminator. The generator is then updated using a
gradient approximated using the likelihood ratio trick, where pi is the probability of the generated
responses, and b({x, y}) is an unbiased baseline value to reduce the estimate variance:
∇J(θ) ≈
[Q+({x, y})− b({x, y})]∇log pi(y|x) =
[Q+({x, y})− b({x, y})]∇
∑
t
log p(yt|x; y1:t−1)
(2)
Again, as with standard GAN training, the discriminator is simultaneously updated with the human
generated dialogue {x, yhuman} containing the dialogue history as a positive example, and the
machine-generated dialogue {x, ygenerated} as a negative example.
3.2 DANCin SEQ2SEQ
We now describe a proposed algorithm, DANCin SEQ2SEQ, that draws on the REINFORCE
formulation described above to instead generate adversarial examples intended to fool a target binary
text classifier model.
3.2.1 REINFORCE for Adversarial Example Generation
Specifically, we consider the problem formulated as follows: the target is a binary text classifier
trained to discriminate between positively and negatively labeled text examples from a given dataset.
Now, given a text example x whose true label is positive, the adversarial model needs to generate a
rewritten example x′ = x1, x2, ...xT , where x′ should preserve semantic similarity to x, but fool the
target model into outputting the incorrect negative label.
We cast this problem as a reinforcement learning task, and propose a simple modification to the
GAN-like REINFORCE formulation described in 3.1 to allow for adversarial example generation. In
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our formulation, the generative model G defines the policy that takes the original positively-labeled
input example x, and attempts to generate a rewritten adversarial example x′.
We then use the target binary text classifier model as the discriminator D, which receives the
adversarial example x′ as input and outputs the probability that x′ is a positively-labeled example
(Q+(x′)) or a negatively-labeled example (Q−(x′)). Notably, unlike other adversarial example
generation algorithms, this formulation does not require any knowledge of the target model parameters,
allowing the algorithm to attack largely black-box models with access only to the target model
confidences of its classifications.
As our goal is to encourage the generative model to perturb the positively-labeled input example so
that the discriminator assigns an incorrect, negative label to the rewritten example x’, we can now
simply modify the REINFORCE algorithm described in 3.1 so that the generator objective function
rewards sequences that fool the discriminator:
J(θ) = Ey∼p(y|x)[Q−({x′})|θ] (3)
Note that unlike the algorithm in 3.1, the target model D is not itself updated after each episode.
Instead, this represents an attack where we learn to fool a targeted discriminator by interacting with it
repeatedly, but where that target model itself remains fixed.
3.2.2 Preserving Semantic Similarity with an Impartial Judge
Importantly, the objective function above is not sufficient to capture the full adversarial text example
generation problem: in addition to rewarding the generator for rewriting a positively-labeled input
example x so that the resulting text x′ is classified oppositely by the discriminator, we must also
ensure that the rewritten example x′ remains semantically similar to the original, so that a human
would still assign the original, positive label to x′. Intuitively, this is similar in spirit to the adversarial
image generation problem, where algorithms attempt to perturb an input x so that it remains visually
close to the original, while still receiving a different classification from the targeted image classifier.
As discussed above, the discrete semantics of text pose a challenge to applying traditional adversarial
example techniques, which generate “similar” or visually “close” perturbations using gradient-based
methods. However, casting adversarial text example generation as a reinforcement learning task
suggests a solution: we can update the generator objective function to reward sampled adversarial text
examples that not only fool the target classifier, but also preserve semantic similarity to the original
example. Intuitively, this approach also allows us to control the tradeoff between the adversarial
nature and semantic similarity of the generated examples - that is, how much we care that our
rewritten messages remain similar to the originals, versus simply leading the discriminator to assign
an opposite label.
To reward semantic similarity between the original and rewritten examples, we introduce a third
component into training, the impartial judge J. Specifically, we use a judge J represented by a
SEQ2SEQ autoencoder trained on a broad dataset of text examples from the same domain as the
target classifier. We can then measure the similarity between two text examples based on the similarity
of their vector representations when encoded by the impartial judge. Intuitively, adversarial examples
attack target model overfitting to its own objective function - the trained model has learned an
overly “narrow” view of the world by attempting to learn a binary classification function to separate
its labeled training inputs. Therefore, the autoencoder judge trained without the goal of binary
classification should be able to distinguish more impartially between true semantic similarity within
the same text domain.
We can now present the full DANCin SEQ2SEQ objective formulation [Figure 2], which rewards
both misclassification by the target classifier and similarity between the original example x and the
rewritten example x′:
J(θ) =
Ey∼p(y|x)[λadversarialQ−({x′}) + λsimilarCosineSimilarity(Judge(x), Judge(x′)|θ]
(4)
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Figure 2: The DANCin SEQ2SEQ framework and updated reward function.
where Judge(x) is the encoded vector representation of x by the impartial judge, and λadversarial
and λsimilar are hyperparameters controlling the weight placed on fooling the target classifier and
preserving semantic similarity, respectively.
4 Evaluation
4.1 Task
We evaluate the DANCin SEQ2SEQ framework on the Enron Spam dataset, which consists of 16,545
labeled ham (non-spam) messages, and 17,171 labeled spam messages drawn from the released Enron
corporation emails [Enr].
Specifically, we consider the task of attacking a fixed target spam-ham binary text classifier D, by
generating adversarial examples x’ based on unseen input spam message examples x. Our generator
model should attempt to rewrite the input spam examples to increase the probability that they are
classified as not spam by the target classifier, while still preserving human semantic similarity to
the original spam messages. We choose this task to represent a realistic domain for adversarial
example generation attacks, where misclassification holds real-world negative consequences. While
the algorithm requires access to target classifier confidences in its classifications, the ease of gathering
realistic training data also means that an attacker could reasonably employ a strategy similar to
Papernot et. al’s practical black-box attack, in which adversarial training examples generated against
a known model are then transferred to attack an actual, unknown target [Papernot et al., 2017].
4.2 Experimental Details
Dataset preprocessing. As token-level SEQ2SEQ models incur significant computational training
costs in proportion to input vocabulary size and sequence length, for these demonstration experiments,
we preprocess the dataset to restrict both.
In particular, we first divide the full, randomly shuffled Enron Spam dataset into training, validation,
and test dataset splits following a roughly 80-10-10 ratio, resulting in a training dataset consisting
of 13,236 ham, 13,736 spam, a validation dataset consisting of 1,654 ham, 1,717 spam, and a test
dataset consisting of 1,655 ham, 1,718 spam messages. These dataset splits, along with all other
dataset preprocessing code, are publicly available on Github [git].
To reduce sequence length, all text examples were lowercased, tokenized on white space, and then
normalized to a fixed length of 30 tokens, by truncating longer examples and padding shorter examples
with an introduced <PAD> token.
To reduce vocabulary size, we restricted the text example vocabulary to the set consisting of the 3,000
most frequent tokens in each of the spam and ham classes within the training dataset, resulting in a
total vocabulary of 4,628 distinct tokens. All examples were then preprocessed according to this fixed
vocabulary, and out of vocabulary tokens were simply replaced with an introduced <UNK> token.
Additionally, start and end of sequence tokens were pre and postpended to all examples.
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Figure 3: Sample spam and ham examples, after sentence length normalization and vocabulary size
restriction.
Model details. As described, the DANCin SEQ2SEQ framework consists of three components: the
adversarial example generator G, the target binary classifier D, and the impartial judge J.
As a target binary classifier D, we use a Multinomial Naive Bayes model trained on the preprocessed
training spam-ham dataset with Laplace smoothing parameter 1.0. Because we focus on designing
practical, real-world attacks, we chose this model architecture after consulting NLP domain experts
to best represent the actual model architectures most frequently used for real-world spam/ham
classification. However, while the limited expressivity of a Naive Bayes model may in fact offer
some robustness advantages to adversarial examples, as discussed earlier, we also recognize that the
model simplicity may handicap its ability to recognize semantically similar adversarial examples;
we therefore invite further experimentation on other target model architectures, such as RNN-based
models, for future exploration. The resulting trained model D achieves 96.0% validation accuracy
with a 99.4% AUC-ROC score, indicating that the model can in fact accurately distinguish spam and
ham messages even after dataset preprocessing.
As an impartial judge J, we use an attentional SEQ2SEQ autoencoder, consisting of a 2-layer
bidirectional LSTM encoder and a single layer LSTM decoder with source and target embedding
dimensions 256, and source and target LSTM hidden dimensions 1024. The autoencoder was
pretrained on the Enron spam-ham training dataset for 1000 epochs using a learning rate of 0.0002,
Adam optimization over the cross entropy loss between the encoded and decoded vectors, and batch-
size 50. Then, during DANCin SEQ2SEQ training, original and rewritten input examples were then
encoded using the pretrained encoder.
As an adversarial example generator G, we use the same SEQ2SEQ architecture as the impartial judge
- in fact, we initialize the model weights using the pretrained autoencoder weights on the training
dataset. During DANCin SEQ2SEQ training, we use the modified objective function described in
3.2.2, with an unbiased baseline calculated as an exponentially decaying running average over the
rewards with baseline weight 0.99 for the previous average at each timestep. We train using Adam
optimization with a learning rate of 0.0002 and batch size of 10.
All fully-runnable model implementations, including trained model checkpoints, are publicly available
on GitHub [git].
Training details. All models were implemented in Python: we draw on the default Scikit-Learn
Multinomial Naive Bayes implementation for the target model [sci], and modify an existing PyTorch
SEQ2SEQ implementation for the impartial judge and generator [seq]. All models were trained on a
Titan X GPU.
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Full Unseen Spam Dataset Training
We first train on n=1717 randomly sampled spam examples, previously unseen by the objective
judge and the targeted classifier, using λadversarial = {0.5, 0.8, 0.9, 0.95}, where λaimilar is set as
1− λadversarial .
Results showing sample original spam examples and the generated adversarial rewritten examples
are shown in Figure 4. From a subjective evaluation of sampled inputs and generated outputs during
training, we observe that the generator does in fact appear to learn a number of intriguing, interpretable
strategies for generating adversarial text examples:
1. Semantically similar token replacement: perhaps most promisingly, we observe that the
generator does in fact learn to replace tokens highly correlated with the spam label, such
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Figure 4: Excerpts from sampled original spam inputs and rewritten adversarial outputs after training
on (n=1717) unseen spam examples.
as mail, medication, software, and (somewhat unfortunately for humans deluged by spam)
unsubscribe with semantically similar, but less spam-like, tokens. Two examples from
training using λadversarial =0.5 are given below, along with the discriminator log-probability
confidence in the targeted non-spam label:
Input (Cham = 3.78e-14): subject: fwd...look younger + more energy + lose
weight in three...
Generated adversarial output (Cham = 3.80e-10): subject: fwd...my age l i ve
a long times weight weeks in in best...
Input (Cham = 0.99): subject: smart spam control...
Generated adversarial output(Cham = 0.99): subject: enjoy internet con-
trol. . .
2. Deletion of spam-associated tokens: we also observe that the generator frequently learns
to simply remove highly spam-correlated tokens, replacing them instead with more neutral
tokens such as the <UNK> token or punctuation. Two examples of this are given below,
again from training using λadversarial=0.5. Notably, in the second example, the generator
also adds the token international, more closely associated with ham data from the Enron
dataset.
Input (Cham = 5.0e-7): subject: professional advertising dear projecthoneypot
@ projecthoneypot . org : we offer e - mail marketing with best services...
Generated adversarial output (Cham = 1.1e-6): subject: professional
advertising dear projecthoneypot @ projecthoneypot . . : we offer e - <UNK>
marketing with <UNK> services
Input (Cham = 3.3e-9): subject: don , t <UNK> this , you have won a prize ! ! !
from : the desk of the managing director...
Generated adversarial output (Cham = 1.9e-7): subject: don , t <UNK>
<UNK> , you have won a ! ! ! ! from : <UNK> international of the managing
director...
Figure 4 showcases additional examples demonstrating semantically-related token substitutions
that increase the discriminator probability of misclassification. Notably, while these examples do
increase the discriminator confidence in the incorrect non-spam class, they do not surpass the standard
Pham = 0.5 threshold necessary for actual misclassification. However, the results are preliminary
but promising, and suggest that the DANCin SEQ2SEQ formulation does in fact offer an approach to
learn semantically meaningful adversarial perturbations against a largely black-box target model.
However, we also find that, as with the original adversarial REINFORCE algorithm for dialogue
generation, GAN-style training is highly unstable; in all experiments, we observed a significant
deterioration in output quality and ultimately complete generator mode collapse within 1-4 epochs of
training, making more robust empirical evaluation on a dataset infeasible given time and computational
resource restraints. In particular, we identify three primary failure cases in adversarial example
generation:
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1. Semantic divergence: especially at higher values of λadversarial, we find that the generator
begins to produce rewritten examples that are no longer semantically similar to the original
message, such as:
Input: subject: winning notifications ! ! ! easy way lottery agency number. . .
Output: subject: winning winning ! ! ! our teens health health promotions...
2. Reward-hacking: especially as training progresses, the generator also tends to discover
that it can also more easily gain a large reward from examples that receive high not-spam
classification scores by exploiting the bag-of-words nature of the Naive Bayes target classifier.
These examples are composed entirely of discovered tokens associated strongly with ham
messages and read like a comical mishmash of “Enronese”; while they clearly do not
preserve semantic similarity, the high discriminator confidence in the target label overrides
the penalty for semantic dissimilarity.
Output: ... consulting hourahead calculation terminated agenda ebiz bro ander-
son anderson tiger fda fda bids...
3. Mode collapse: ultimately, as discussed above, the instability of GAN-style training resulted
in full generator mode collapse for all training regimens, even after a preliminary search over
learning rate and other hyperparameter adjustments. This same instability was also described
in the related adversarial REINFORCE work, which suggests that mode collapse may appear
due to reward sparsity in training - that is, the generator learns that it has stumbled into
a low-reward domain and receives repeated negative feedback, but is unclear on how to
correct this, ultimately leading to full divergence in most basic adversarial training regimens.
This mode collapse manifests in outputs composed of repetitive, low-meaning tokens.
Output: subject: ! ! ! ! ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )...
4.3.2 Low-Confidence Spam Dataset Training
Figure 5: Excerpts from sampled original spam inputs and rewritten adversarial outputs after training
on (n=171) low-confidence spam examples.
After training on the full set of n=1717 randomly sampled, previously unseen spam examples,
we observe that one significant challenge in generating adversarial text examples may be the task
simplicity, even for the relatively simple target classifier. The majority of spam and ham examples
from the Enron dataset simply do not look alike to a bag-of-words classifier, making it quite difficult
for the generator to discover enough semantically similar perturbations to fool the target classifier. In
this section, we therefore draw on ideas from teacher forcing to attempt to avoid or prolong training
instability by instead training within an easier, less reward-sparse domain. In particular, we order
all n=1717 spam examples by their discriminator confidence, and select the 10% (n=171) of spam
examples with the lowest discriminator confidence in the spam label for training. Intuitively, training
the generator on these examples allows the generator to observe a larger quantity of tokens that may
be less strongly associated with the spam label, guiding exploration within an easier domain.
Sampled excerpts from training on these low-confidence spam examples are shown in Figure 5.
Ultimately, we find that training in this domain is still prone to the same training instability, leading to
generator mode collapse after several training epochs. However, a subjective evaluation of generator
outputs prior to mode collapse, as seen in Table 2, suggests that the generator appears to learn
more complex, semantically-meaningful token substitutions, which more strongly resemble actual
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ham tokens and token sequences from the Enron dataset. These results suggest that pre-training
on lower-confidence examples offers a promising pre-training regimen for generating adversarial
examples - for example, a staggered training regimen on increasingly difficult examples may better
drive exploration in discovering adversarial, semantically-meaningful token substitutions.
5 Discussion
Summary. In this work, we motivated and introduced DANCin SEQ2SEQ, a framework for gen-
erating adversarial text examples targeting black-box text classifiers. Drawing on REINFORCE
formulations that adapt GAN-style training to the discrete text generation domain, we recast adversar-
ial example generation as a reinforcement learning task, and introduce an algorithm that rewards a
generator for producing semantically similar perturbations to input text sequences that increase the
probability of misclassification by the targeted model.
Using an actual text classification task - spam filtering, trained on the real-world Enron spam dataset
- we find that our algorithm produces encouraging, but highly preliminary: in particular, training
results suggest that the generator does in fact learn to identify and remove highly spam-correlated
tokens based on largely black-box interactions with the target classifier. Even more promisingly,
in many cases, the generator learns adversarial token substitutions that increase the probability of
misclassification while still preserving human semantic similarity.
Limitations and Future Work. While initial experiments suggest that GAN-style training offers a
promising framework for adversarial example generation, we also find that - as with previous research
on similar GAN-style learning regimens - training is highly unstable, and prone to divergence. We
anticipate, however, that many strategies employed for reinforcement-learning-based text generation
could yield similar stability improvements: for example, Li. et. al. suggest applying a penalty for
repeated tokens to avoid the common mode collapse case, and offer a reward for every generation
step (REGS) formulation that allows the generator to receive feedback even before the end of the full
sequence generation episode [Li et al., 2017]. Future exploration could also consider reintroducing a
true GAN-style discriminator, updated during training, to distinguish between human and machine
generated examples. This could further reward higher quality generated adversarial examples.
As this work evaluates the DANCin SEQ2SEQ framework on the real-world but fairly limited
binary spam-ham classification task, much work remains to further evaluate the algorithm on more
challenging tasks, and against other target model architectures. Interestingly, we observe that even
the learned adversarial examples that do not preserve semantic similarity, but instead exploit the
bag-of-words nature of the Naive Bayes classifier used here, reveal fundamental assumptions made
by the target classifier - without access to the model training details, these adversarial examples
intuitively suggest how the target model approaches classification, and thus how it might fail. Future
experimentation on more complex classification tasks and model architectures could yield similar
interpretable insights. As with adversarial example generation in the image domain, this algorithm
therefore offers a useful framework for understanding important target model vulnerabilities and
limitations.
Overall, we believe that this work offers a promising approach towards understanding practical
attacks on text-based classifiers, a high impact but previously under-explored domain. We hope that
generating and understanding adversarial text examples will motivate further work in building more
robust, nuanced, and well-defended text classification models.
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